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COMMENT
THE APPLICABILITY OF MIRANDA TO RETRIALS
The United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey1
held that the exclusionary rule of Miranda v. Arizona' would be
"available only to persons whose trials had not begun as of June 13,
1966," 3 the date of the Miranda decision. The Johnson Court de-
cided that Miranda's application should be limited so that it would not
upset either final judgments or judgments in cases "still pending on
direct appeal [from] trials preceding Escobedo and Miranda," ' that is,
nonfinal judgments. The Court, however, has not spoken directly to the
issue of whether Miranda should apply in retrials, granted either on
direct appeal or on collateral attack, when the case was reversed on
grounds other than violation of the rules of Miranda.5 Six of the state
courts which have faced this issue have decided that the exclusionary
1384 U.S. 719 (1966).
2384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3384 U.S. 734 (1966). The Court likewise held that the rule of Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), would apply only in trials beginning after the date of
Escobedo.
4384 U.S. 733. For discussion of the wisdom of prospective rulings by the Supreme
Court, see Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process
of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 57-58 (1965) ; The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
80 Hagv. L. REV. 125, 129-41 (1966) ; Comment, Linkletter, Shott, & the Retroactivity
Problem in Escobedo, 64 MicH. L. REv. 832 (1966). The Johnson court found "no
jurisprudential or constitutional obstacles" to holding Mirandds standards to apply
prospectively only. 384 U.S. at 733.
5This question is most urgently presented in the situation in which the retrial
was granted before Miranda was handed down. The language quoted in the text
accompanying note 4 sipra lends itself to the argument that a retrial granted after
Miranda does not raise a similar problem. Such an interpretation, however, would
create the anomaly of not applying Miranda to retrials granted after other retrials to
which Miranda might apply. Hence, for purposes of this discussion, it is assumed
that the "cases pending on appeal" statement refers only to judgments not reversed
on Miranda grounds.
A distinction between cases in which a retrial is granted on direct appeal and
those in which a retrial is granted on collateral attack might be attempted on the
issue of finality. In the former cases the convictions are not yet final when the retrial
is granted, while in the latter cases direct review has been exhausted and the convictions
are considered final. Under Johnson, Miranda does not apply to decisions already final
at the time of the Miranda decision. However, in both situations the defendant must
be given a new trial as if there had been no previous trial. See note 18 infra. From
this viewpoint, the finality distinction is not significant.
A second possible distinction is that retrials following collateral attack are likely
to examine more distant events and involve greater evidentiary burdens in retrial
than ones resulting from direct attack. However, the appellate process can be greatly
prolonged. If a distinction is to be made between more and less distant cases, then
there should be both retrials resulting from collateral attack and those from appellate
review on each side of the dividing line.
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principle of Miranda shall be applied in retrial;' the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits have also decided
that Miranda is applicable.7 Four state courts have taken the opposite
position, challenging Miranda's applicability on retrial.8
The Court in Miranda, anxious to protect the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, held that before there can be any
in-custody interrogation of the accused, the accused must be advised of
his constitutional rights and of the potential use of his statements. In
order to ensure the effectiveness of these warnings, the Court demanded
the use of certain "procedural safeguards" 9 or of procedures demon-
strated by the state to be the equivalent thereof.' In the event that
any one of the procedures is not followed, the subsequent statements of
the accused are summarily to be excluded at trial upon the motion of
the defendant-the statements are to be excluded without inquiry into
whether the procedural deficiency actually impaired the voluntariness
of the statements." State and federal cases prior to Miranda and
Escobedo v. Illinois,'" the forerunner of Miranda, had not set such
stringent requirements for the protection of the accused's fifth amend-
ment privilege."3 The previous measure of admissibility was the
"voluntariness test" which examines the "totality of circumstances"
6 State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 416 P.2d 601 (1966) ; People v. Doherty, - Cal.
2d -, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) ; State v. Ruiz, - Hawaii -, 421 P.2d
305 (1966) ; Creech v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1967) ; State v. Brad-
shaw, - R.I. -, 221 A.2d 815 (1966) ; State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d
458 (1966).
7 Gibson v. United States, 363 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1966); United States ex re.
Pierce v. Pinto, 259 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.J. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 374 F.2d 472 (3d
Cir. 1967).
With the exception of People v. Doherty, - Cal. 2d -, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 857 (1967), the cases holding Miranda applicable on retrial do so without dis-
cussion of the issue. In Doherty, the California Supreme Court relied on a refutation
of the contrary position, rather than on affirmative reasoning. See text accompanying
note 40 infra.
s Jenkins v. State, - Del. -, 230 A.2d 262 (1967) ; People v. Worley, - Ill. 2d
-, 227 N.E.2d 746 (1967); State v. Vigliano, - N.J. -, 232 A.2d 129 (1967);
People v. La Belle, 53 Misc. 2d 111, 277 N.Y.S.2d 847 (County Ct 1967). See also
Commonwealth v. Brady (0. & T. of Q.S. of Crawford County, July 17, 1967), in
The Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 16, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
9 The Supreme Court enumerated the following procedures in Miranda: the
accused must be advised (1) that he has a right to remain silent; (2) that anything
he may say can be used against him; (3) that he has a right to the presence of counsel
during the interrogation; and (4) that if he cannot pay an attorney, one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning. Provision was also made for knowing
waiver of these rights, and for their re-effectuation should there be any indication
that the accused wishes to discontinue the interrogation. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
1o Id. at 467.
"1 Id. at 444, 468, 479.
12 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Court held that once the police focus on the accused,
he must be advised of his privilege to remain silent and he must be allowed to consult
with an attorney upon request The Court in Miranda further explained what was
intended in Escobedo. 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
13 The Court in Miranda indicated that the privilege against self-incrimination
may be violated even if the accused's statements are not entered into evidence against
him at trial:
Today . . . there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons
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surrounding the incriminating statements in an effort to determine
if the confession was given freely.'4
The majority in Johnson, honoring the reliance of police and
courts on the old standards and conscious of the havoc which full
retroactivity could play with the administration of justice,'5 limited
the retroactivity of Miranda and Escobedo to the decided cases
themselves. In setting the time of trial as the criterion of Miranda's
applicability, however, the Court failed to consider what should be done
in retrials granted on grounds other than Miranda. The ultimate
determination of this issue must reflect consideration of the different
values which the Miranda and Johnson decisions sought to protect.
Both courts ordering Miranda applicable in retrial and courts
denying its applicability have found support in the wording of the
Johnson decision. The statement in Johnson that Miranda shall apply
only to "trials" begun after Miranda was decided,' 6 taken alone, would
seem to indicate that Johnson demands that the exclusionary rule be
applicable in retrial. The courts which accept this view conceive of
in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.
384 U.S. at 467. A more narrow interpretation is given by Chief Justice Traynor
of the California Supreme Court:
The basis for the warnings required by Miranda is the privilege against self-
incrimination . . , and that privilege is not violated when the information
elicited from an unwarned suspect is not used against him.
People v. Varnum, - Cal. 2d -, -, 427 P.2d 772, 775, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 111
(1967). However, Mr. Justice Peters, dissenting, thought that whether or not the
statement is introduced at trial, Escobedo and Miranda recognize a "right to privacy
. . . the moment interrogation starts." Id. at -, 427 P.2d at 778, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 114.
141Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) ; State v. Vigliano, - N.J.
, 232 A.2d 129, 136 (1967); see Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740
(1966):
The standard of voluntariness which has evolved in state cases under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the same general standard
which applied in federal prosecutions-a standard grounded in the policies of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-8
(1964).
In Malloy v. Hogan the Court held that "the Fifth Amendment's exception from
compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgement by the States." 378 U.S. at 6. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Black thus asserted that this portion of the fifth amendment is "incorporated" in the
fourteenth amendment and must be heeded by the states. Mr. Justice Harlan, dis-
senting, disagreed with the "incorporation" doctrine, seeing no need for the incorpo-
ration since adequate protection is afforded the accused under the due process clause
alone. 378 U.S. at 21-27. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Black, J.) ;
id. at 408 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the voluntariness test,
see text accompanying notes 61-64 infra.
15 384 U.S. at 731. For discussion of these issues, see text accompanying notes
40-41, 50-51 infra.
'5 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
17 People v. La Belle, 53 Misc. 2d 111, 113, 277 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (County
Court 1967) (dictum). This would mean that even though the specific procedural
safeguards were enunciated for the first time after the time of the in-custody interro-
gation of the accused, statements made by him will be inadmissible in evidence against
him if any of the safeguards have not been observed, or if the State cannot demon-
strate that equivalent protective measures have been taken. Such is already the situ-
ation in cases in which the interrogation occurred before Miranda, but the initial
trial began after Miranda.
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the term "retrial" as subsumed in the term "trial." In some states this
concept is articulated in statutes which define a retrial as an entirely
new beginning; the courts of two of those states have relied upon
these statutes as support for holding Miranda applicable on retrial.'8
Other parts of the Johnson opinion, however, create some doubt
whether the Court intended this interpretation of the word "trial."
The Court states, for example, that "Future defendants will benefit
fully from our new standards governing in-custody interrogation,
while past defendants may still avail themselves of the voluntariness
test." '1 This reference to "past" and "future" defendants is incon-
clusive. If the position is accepted that when a new trial is granted,
it "shall proceed in all respects as if no former trial had been had,"
the fact that the defendant was also a prior defendant would seem to
be irrelevant. Several courts, however, have taken the position that
the availability of a "second chance" does not obviate the existence of
the first trial. In the words of one court, such a defendant "is cer-
tainly not a future defendant, having been one well over two years
prior to Miranda and the Supreme Court could not have had those in
his position in mind." 2
There is other language in the Johnson decision, however, which
would tend to support the classification of a defendant in a retrial as
a "past" defendant. It was the precise holding of the Court that
"Escobedo and Miranda should apply only to cases commenced after
those decisions were announced." 21 The term "case" usually incor-
porates the entire history of the judicial proceedings against the accused.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, holding Miranda in-
applicable in retrial, understood "cases commenced" to refer to cases
in which the first judicial step was taken after Miranda.' They urged
that their view
accords with a commonplace of the criminal law in this
country, i.e., an order for a new trial as an incident of a
reversal of a conviction on appeal simply amounts to a
continuance of the same case looking toward a final judgment
of either acquittal or conviction.'
Under this view, the defendant in a retrial is a "past defendant," and
therefore, under Johnson, does not have the benefit of the Miranda
18 State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 172, 416 P.2d 601, 605 (1966) (citing ARiz. R.
Camu. P. 314: "the new trial shall proceed in all respects as if no former trial had
been had.") ; People v. Doherty, - Cal. 2d -, -, 429 P.2d 177, 185, 59 Cal. Rptr.
857, 865 (1967) (citing 50 CAL. PENAL" CODE § 1180: "The granting of a new trial
places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had.").
19 384 U.S. at 732 (emphasis added).
20 People v. La Belle, 53 Misc. 2d 111, 113, 277 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (County Ct.
1967).
21384 U.S. at 733 (emphasis added).
22State v. Vigliano, - N.J. -, -, 232 A.2d 129, 137 (1967).
23 Id.
320 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
exclusionary principle on retrial. Even if state statutes declare a
retrial to be a new beginning, they are not controlling. The inter-
pretation of the word "trial" is properly ascertained from the Johnson
opinion itself, not from an outside source.2"
The basic argument for the non-retroactivity of Miranda lies in
the concern of the Johnson court for police reliance and the potential
burden on the administration of justice These "countervailing
interests" 2 were balanced against the purpose of the Miranda rule
and the availability of other safeguards." Although the Court did
not deny the possibility of past or pending cases in which "tainted"
confessions have been used, the discrimination against those defendants
was thought to be outweighed by "the exigencies of the situation." '
If the "countervailing" factors are as significant in the retrial situation,
Johnson suggests that the application of Miranda on retrial is not
demanded. However, because this issue was not in the direct purview
of the Court's decision, there may be factors peculiar to the retrial
situation which could suggest differing application of Miranda to
retrials and to other non-final judgments.
The reliance of public officials on standards acceptable prior to
the Escobedo and Miranda decisions is emphasized throughout the
Johnson opinion: '
Law enforcement agencies fairly relied on these prior cases,
now no longer binding, in obtaining incriminating statements
during the intervening years preceding Escobedo and
Miranda. This is in favorable comparison to the situation
before Mapp v. Ohio . . . , where the States at least knew
that they were constitutionally forbidden from engaging in
unreasonable searches and seizures under Wolf v. Colorado
30
24 People v. La Belle, 53 Misc. 2d 111, 114, 277 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850 (County Ct.
1967).
25384 U.S. at 731-33.
26See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967).
27 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729( 1966).
In Stovall v. Deinw, when considering the extent to which the new constitutional
rules on "lineups" should be applied retroactively, the Court noted that
The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to
be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law en-
forcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the ad-
ministration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
388 U.S. at 297. See text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
28 384 U.S. at 727, 728-29. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299. But see id.
at 304 (Black, J., dissenting).
29 But see People v. Doherty, - Cal. 2d -, -, 429 P.2d 177, 183, 59 Cal. Rptr.
857, 863 (1967) (denying that reliance was important in Johnson).
30 384 U.S. at 731. The Supreme Court, in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965), held that the Mapp decision would not be retroactive. Mapp, however, was
held to be applicable to all cases not yet final on the date when Mapp was decided.
The disparity between Linkletter and the ruling in Johnson (that Miranda would not
apply to cases not yet final at the time of Miranda) can be explained on the ground
[Vo1.116:316
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S .. Law enforcement officers and trial courts will have
fair notice that statements taken in violation of these
standards may not be used against an accused. Prospective
application only to trials begun after the standards were
announced is particularly appropriate here. Authorities
attempting to protect the privilege have not been apprised
heretofore of the specific safeguards which are now oblig-
atory. Consequently they have adopted devices which,
although below the constitutional minimum, were not inten-
tional evasions of the requirements of the privilege."'
Assuming that the stated reliance was justifiable,," it has been argued
that this reliance was sufficient reason in Johnson for not applying
Miranda to non-final cases. s From this premise, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey reasoned that "such reliance should have the same
operative effect if the appeal results in a reversal and an order for a
new trial" as it would if there were no reversal.
The reliance argument is persuasive when a court's decision would
not only conflict with a party's anticipations, but also would place that
party in a disadvantaged position because of his reliance.35 It is doubt-
ful that validation of past official conduct in itself can justify the non-
retroactivity decision of Johnson. It might be argued that a retro-
active decision impairs public confidence in the police and thus hampers
law enforcement efficiency, but there is no indication in Johnson of a
fear of criticizing the police. It appears far more likely that the Court
in Johnson was concerned primarily with the burden on the adminis-
tration of justice which would follow a decision that Miranda be
applied retroactively. 6
that the Court had applied the rule of Mapp to non-final decisions prior to the Link-
letter decision and was not free to discontinue this practice. Prior to Johnson the
Court had not applied the rule of Miranda to non-final cases (except to the over-
ruling cases themselves) and was free not to apply Miranda to non-final cases. People
v. Rollins, 65 Cal. 2d 681, 689-90, 423 P.2d 221, 227-28, 56 Cal. Rptr. 293, 299-300
(1967). On the advisability of drawing the line at the time of trial, see People v.
Rollins, id. at 688 n.7, 423 P.2d at 226 n.7, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 298 n.7 (1967).
-31384 U.S. at 732-33.3 2 See State v. Vigliano, - N.J. -, -, 232 A.2d 129, 137 (1967); State v.
Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d at 446-47, 143 N.W.2d at 475 (dissenting opinion). But see
People v. Rollins, 65 Cal. 2d at 687, 423 P.2d at 225, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (1967).
In light of the Escobedo decision, it is arguable that as the date of the overruling
decision approached, law enforcement officers could not have fairly relied on past
standards since the probability of a change in standards was great.
33 State v. Vigliano, - N.J. -, -, 232 A.2d 129, 137 (1967). This proposition
is questionable, however, since reliance was given no weight by the Johnson court
for those cases to be tried for the first time after Miranda and in which the interro-
gation process preceded the date of Miranda. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
34 State v. Vigliano, - N.J. -, -, 232 A.2d 129, 137 (1967).
35 There is significance to a party's reliance, even when there is no injury caused
by such reliance, if the "symbol" of justice and stability in the law would be jeopard-
ized. For a discussion of the importance of the symbolic function of the law, see
Mishkin, supra note 4, at 62-76.
36 Moreover, the burden on the administration of justice is worthy of considera-
tion because of the justifiability of the reliance.
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The essential concern in Johnson was the fear that
retroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda would seri-
ously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws. It
would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners
found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with
previously announced constitutional standards.
87
The Court articulated a similar apprehension in Stovall v. Denno,
where a new rule ' involving the constitutional requirements for
identification "line-ups" was held to be prospective in application. "At
the very least, the processing of current criminal calendars would be
disrupted while hearings were conducted to determine taint, if any, in
identification evidence . . . . " 39
Thus, the Court seems to have been deeply concerned about the
burden of "correcting" completed proceedings. However, even though
a case on retrial is a non-final case, and non-final cases were explicitly
excluded from the area of Mirandds necessary operation by the
Johnson Court, the retrial situation has several distinguishing aspects.
First, since the case must be retried anyway, there will be no
"flood of litigation" problem in requiring that Miranda be applied in
the retrial.' Thus, what was probably the major factor in the Court's
choice of "prospectivity" in Johnson is absent in the instant situation.
Also, if the prosecution feels it will be unable to obtain convictions when
Miranda. is applied, it may choose not to prosecute and further lessen
the existing burdens on the court calendar. The resulting burden on
society of releasing some defendants "found guilty by trustworthy
evidence," 4" will be less onerous than that which would have occurred
if Miranda had been held fully retroactive; the number of defendants
who will be able to utilize Miranda in retrials will be far smaller than
the potential group which could have raised it had it been applied
retroactively in general.
There is a second factor which distinguishes the retrial situation
from final and other non-final cases. Insofar as there must be a
new trial, it offends one's sense of justice to have simultaneous trials
in adjacent courtrooms conducted under different rules. It is disturb-
ing to see one defendant tried under a "second-best" standard, while
another defendant tried concurrently receives the full benefit of the
principles of Miranda.42  To deny application of Miranda in this
37 384 U.S. at 731.
38 see text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
39 388 U.S. at 300.
4 0 See People v. Doherty, - Cal. 2d -, -, 429 P.2d 177, 183-84, 59 Cal. Rptr.
857, 863-64 (1967).
41 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
42-As one court has concluded, "the 'guidelines' suggested by the Chief Justice,
were not available at the time of trial and we see no reason why those principles
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manner would create apparent inconsistency, impairing the symbol of
justice as an impartial arbiter.43 The Supreme Court has already
delineated one area in which the reliance of public officials and the
burden on the administration of justice are not to be allowed over-
riding significance: cases first coming to trial after Miranda and in
which the interrogation occurred before that decision. These are
trials which must be conducted anyway. To have held Miranda
inapplicable to them, would have necessitated non-uniformity of judicial
treatment.44
However, these distinguishing aspects of the retrial situation do
not necessarily compel application of Miranda in retrial. First, the
boundaries of the prospective ruling in Stovall v. Denno suggest that
under certain circumstances there is no impropriety in applying a
former constitutional standard in trials which take place after a new
standard is announced. In Stovall, the Court held that the principles
of United States v. Wade 45 and Gilbert v. California,4 requiring
the exclusion of identification evidence which is tainted by
exhibiting the accused to identifying witnesses before trial in
the absence of his counsel,47 . . . affect only those cases and
all future cases which involve confrontations for identification
purposes conducted in the absence of counsel after this date.Y
The test of applicability is thus not whether the trial occurs after the
date of the overruling decision, as in Johnson, but whether the identi-
fication confrontation ("line-up") takes place after the decision. As
a result, there will be cases tried after the date of the Wade-Gilbert
decision in which the new rule will not apply because the confrontation
occurred prior to that date.
If the "second-best" standard for identification procedures can
be applied at the same time that the new standard is being applied,
should not be applied on the new trial of this cause." Gibson v. United States, 363
F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1966). But see note 50 infra.
At the same time that it seems inconsistent to deny the retrial defendant the
benefit of Miranda, while giving that advantage to original-trial defendants, it seems
inconsistent to give that benefit to the retrial defendant and not to a defendant tried
prior to Mirana who did not enjoy the fortuity of reversible error in his original
trial. People v. Doherty, - Cal. 2d at -, 429 P.2d at 187-88, 59 Cal. Rptr. at
867-68 (1967) (concurring opinion). It has also been argued that it is "neither
logical nor reasonable that the retrial should be conducted under rules different from
those prevailing when the cases were tried for the first time." Jenkins v. State, -
Del. -, -, 230 A.2d 262, 274 (1967). See State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. at 175-76,
416 P.2d at 608-09 (dissenting opinion).43 See note 35 vsupra.
44 In the situation of a defendant coming to trial for the first time after Miranda
who was interrogated prior to Miranda, the proximity of the interrogation process
to the trial diminishes the evidentiary burden facing prosecutors and public officers.
For the importance of the evidentiary burden, see text accompanying note 51 infra.
45 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
46 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
47 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 294 (1967).4 8 Id. at 296.
1967]
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there should be less conceptual difficulty in applying the "voluntariness"
standard of confession admissibility at the same time that Miranda is
being applied. The purpose of the new rule in Wade and Gilbert was
to prevent prejudice to the defendant and to avoid mistaken identifica-
tions. These are concerns which affect the reliability of the guilt-
determining process. In Miranda, reliability was not as much of an
issue " as was the protection of the dignity of the accused and the
desire not to force a defendant to convict himself. If, in a narrow
range of cases, the Court is willing to suspend application of a higher
standard which enhances the reliability of the system, it should be far
less disturbing to suspend application of Miranda where the main
consideration is the procedural integrity of the system. Thus, the
argument that "second-best" constitutional standards should not be
used concurrently with best standards is not conclusive in the retrial
situation.5 °
Second, the burden on the administration of justice is not elim-
inated completely merely because there must be a new trial regardless
of Miranda. Evidence previously foregone in reliance upon former
standards of confession admissibility now must be gathered to fill the
void left by the excluded confession. When the same problem was
presented in Stovall, the Court was careful to note this as a "counter-
vailing interest:" "Doubtless, too, inquiry would be handicapped by
the unavailability of witnesses and dim memories." 5'
In this regard, the retrial situation is distinguishable from a post-
Miranda original trial after a pre-Miranda interrogation, a case in
which, as noted above, the Court gave Miranda retroactive application.
In the latter case, the evidence which the police must compile is still
likely to be "fresh," and it can be expected that before the trial these
officials will have an opportunity to acquire the needed evidence. In
the retrial situation, the police face a far more difficult task in
attempting to compensate for the inadmissibility of the confession since
49 The Court in Miranda mentioned unreliability of coerced confessions only in
a footnote. 384 U.S. at 455 n.24.
50 The Johnson opinion explicitly left open to the states the freedom to apply
Miranda more retroactively than was demanded by Johnson. 384 U.S. at 733. Cer-
tainly if a state already has applied Miranda to other non-final cases, disregarding
the burden on the administration of justice, it would only be consistent to apply
Miranda in the retrial situation as well.
51388 U.S. at 300. But see People v. Rollins, 65 Cal. 2d at 696, 423 P.2d at
232, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (dissent), arguing that Miranda should be applied to all
cases not yet final at the time of Miranda, even though inevitably "hardships to the
police would result"':
The burdening of the administration of criminal justice is a price we must
pay to enforce our Bill of Rights, and a price we should pay without hesitation.
The powers of governments, and that includes the police, are limited by the
Bill of Rights. When such rights are invaded we must repulse such invasion
and protect such rights even at the expense of inconvenience.
The Court in Miranda likewise asserts that the fifth amendment privilege "cannot be
abridged" to satisfy "society's need for interrogation," 384 U.S. at 479, or to lessen
the labors of government. Id. at 460.
[Vo1.116:316
MIRANDA AND RETRIALS
the trial is further removed in time from the investigation. The un-
availability of evidence may necessitate dismissals or acquittals, should
Miranda be applied.
The interest of society here cannot be dismissed easily. It might
be argued that by virtue of the establishment of stricter standards in
Miranda, the Court has balanced society's interest in protection and
safety against an accused's constitutional privileges, and has chosen to
run the risk that people who have committed crimes will avoid im-
prisonment. However, in the normal case where Miranda will govern,
the police will have had prior notice of the constitutional requirements
and will have the opportunity to gather the evidence necessary to
convict the guilty. In the retrial situation, through their justifiable
reliance on the admissibility of confessions, the police have foregone
the opportunity to gather such evidence and society's interest cannot be
protected. Thus, the Miranda balance does not necessarily control
this situation.
In determining whether Miranda should be applied in retrials,
the burden imposed by the evidentiary difficulties must be measured
against the adequacy of the alternative standard, the voluntariness
test. Consideration of alternative devices for protecting the accused
was noted as a legitimate concern in Johnson:
We are thus concerned with a question of probabilities and
must take account, among other factors, of the extent to
which other safeguards are available to protect the integrity
of the truth-determining process at trial.52
The greater the gap between the degree of protection afforded by
Miranda and that afforded by the voluntariness test, the greater is the
pressure to override the factors of police reliance, evidentiary burden
and society interest, and to apply Miranda in retrial.
The fact that stricter rules were promulgated in Miranda indicates
the Court's dissatisfaction with the voluntariness test.53 Modern police
practice "is psychologically rather than physically oriented." 5 The
psychological effect of a potentially coercive situation is difficult for
the trial judge and jury to measure under the voluntariness test.55 The
J52 384 U.S. at 729.
53Referring to the Miranda case and its companion cases, the Miranda Court
said that they "might not find the defendant's statements to have been involuntary
in traditional terms." 384 U.S. at 457.
54 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
65 The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and
methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly
in cases such as this where it is necessary to make fine judgments as to the
effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and
will of an accused.
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
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Court in Miranda thought that many subtle pressures could be elim-
inated if those accused were explicitly told of their rights. Estimates
of an accused's understanding of his constitutional privileges in the
absence of specifically being informed of them can only be speculative. 6
Judicial problems in reviewing the effect of these practices were com-
pounded by the difficulty of litigating what actually happened in the
stationhouse."' The defendant's primary means of showing coercion
was to match his testimony against that of the interrogating officers.
Miranda sought to eliminate such "swearing contests" by ensuring
that the individual knew he has the right not to confess and by placing
a lawyer in the stationhouse as an informed observer."
However, neither Miranda nor Johnson indicated that every
statement acquired when the procedural safeguards are not followed
is necessarily involuntary." The Court was not denying "past de-
fendants" whose involuntary confessions had been used against them
the opportunity for redress. On the contrary, the Court specifically
noted that they are entitled to a "full and fair hearing," 60 but that
the "exigencies of the situation" demand that this hearing be governed
by the voluntariness test instead of the Miranda rules. The issue at
hand is whether the lesser "exigencies" presented by retrials also justify
employment of the lower standard.
In view of the effect Miranda itself will have on the voluntariness
standard, it is difficult to assess how much less protection will be pro-
vided by the "voluntariness test" than by the Miranda rules. The
Court in Johnson noted that:
Prisoners may invoke a substantive test of voluntariness
which, because of the persistence of abusive practices, has
become increasingly meticulous through the years..
That test now takes specific account of the failure to advise
the accused of his privilege against self-incrimination or to
allow him access to outside assistance.'
The standards of the voluntariness test thus are "evolving" standards,62
flexible enough to take into account the concerns pointed out by
56 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69, 471-72 n.43 (1966).
57 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967), where one of the reasons given
for the rule announced in Wade and Gilbert was "the likelihood that the accused will
often be precluded from reconstructing what occurred and thereby from obtaining a
full hearing on the identification issue at trial."
58 Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1967) (dictum).
59 See Commonwealth v. Brady (0. & T. of Q.S. of Crawford County, July 17,
1967) in The Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 16, 1967, at 4, col. 6.
'60 384 U.S. at 730.
61Id. See Davis v. North Carolina, 184 U.S. 737, 740 (1966); United States
ex rel. Pierce v. Pinto, 259 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D.N.J. 1966) ; People v. La Belle,
53 Misc. 2d 111, 113, 277 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (County Ct. 1967). The Miranda Court,
in fact, asserted that their holding was not an "innovation" in the field. 384 U.S.
at 442.
62 See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966), a post-Miranda de-
cision in which defendant did prevail under the "evolved" voluntariness test.
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Miranda. Under this "evolved" standard, the contrast between the
treatment of the retrial defendant and the original-trial defendant will
be diminished, society's interest will be protected and the harsh
evidentiary burdens will be averted.
If this position is accepted-that the contrast between the treat-
ment of the original-trial defendant under Miranda and of the retrial
defendant under the "second-best" standard is not untenable in the
light of the exigencies of the situation-it remains to be asked what
could be gained by application of Miranda in retrial. The rules of
Miranda were promulgated in order to deter certain police conduct
which tended to jeopardize the privileges of the accused. The rules
also made explicit what behavior was required of police. It is now
too late to deter the behavior of police with regard to the retrial
defendant; if the police conduct fell below the standards announced
in Miranda, the dignity of the individual has already suffered.
Application of Miranda could prevent this injury from culminating in
self-incrimination at trial. However, application of the voluntariness
test could at least prevent this in most obvious cases of coercion.64
Consequently, the circumstances of the retrial situation make the use
of the voluntariness test preferable to application of Miranda on retrial.
63See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 503 (1966).
64 In view of the hardships incumbent upon applying the exclusionary principle
of Miranda, several state courts have preferred application of the voluntariness test
as it is described by the United States Supreme Court in the Davis case. See, e.g.,
State v. Vigliano, - N.J. -, -, 232 A.2d 129, 138 (1967).
